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WARFARE IN THE 21ST CENTURY

R e u t e r s p h o t o RT R 2 3 H I F b y A h m a d M a s o o d

People run from a suicide car bomb blast outside the German embassy in Kabul, Afghanistan, 17 January 2009.

Force Protection and Suicide Bombers:
The Necessity for Two Types of
Canadian Military Red Teams
by Robert J. Bunker

Introduction and Background

T

his article will discuss why the use of two types
of red teams - analytical and physical - to identify and then simulate ‘suicide bomber threat
scenarios’ is necessary for the force protection
training of deploying Canadian military units.
Red teaming as a discipline can be divided into two basic
forms: (1) analytical red teaming, which is diegetic in nature;
that is, based upon descriptive products and decision support
functions and (2) physical red teaming, which is mimetic in
nature; that is, derived from live-action and role playing-based
training with an opposing force (OPFOR) deployed against a
friendly military unit.1 These forms of red teaming are intimately linked, create synergies when utilized together, and
should be fully harnessed for Canadian military force protection requirements. One of the greatest lost opportunities of
utilizing red teams in the past has been the decoupling of these
two very different forms of red teams from one another.
The article will be divided into three main sections that
a) provide general guidance concerning how to determine
enemy intent (and capability) via analytical red teaming, b)
Vol. 12, No. 4, Autumn 2012

show how to determine and prioritize the types of likely suicide bomber threat scenarios a deployed force will face, and
c) show how to conduct the physical red teaming of these
identified higher priority suicide bomber threat scenarios. It
will conclude with some general observations concerning the
value both forms of red teaming provide for the force protection requirements of deploying Canadian military units
against the threat of suicide bombings.
A brief overview of the threat suicide bombings represent to military forces and the globalization of this terrorist
and insurgent technique needs to be provided for context.
Contemporary suicide bombings have been taking place since
the early-1980s, and have been directed at both military and
Dr. Robert J. Bunker holds degrees in political science, government,
behavioral science, social science, anthropology-geography, and history.
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Determining Enemy
Intent (and Capability)
via Analytical Red
Teaming

T

he value of analytical red
teams that focus upon the
threat of opposing force use of
suicide bombers is to provide
early warning of enemy intent
and capability. Ideally, this
early warning will be provided
At the scene of the aftermath of a suicide bomber attack in Kandahar, Afghanistan, 27 November 2006, the
in
the pre-deployment phase
Canadian Provincial Reconstruction Team Quick Response Force responded to secure the site along Highway 4.
prior to a Canadian military
civilian target sets.2 The first such bombing can be directly force entering a threat environment. This function would exist
traced back to a military engagement that took place during at the ‘strategic early warning’ level with the analysis focusing
the Iran-Iraq War of 1980-1988. The celebrated action of upon general historical suicide bombing threats through curHossein Fahmideh, a 13-year old boy who destroyed an Iraqi rent theatre of operations I&W (indications and warnings),
tank at the Battle of Khorramshahr in 1982, was the focal and actual suicide bombing incidents targeting allied military
event. Hossein sacrificed his own life, detonating a satchel forces. Once a Canadian military force has been deployed into
charge underneath an Iraqi tank in a final act of desperation.3 a foreign theatre, ‘operational early warning’ should then be
This technique, which resonated with the cult of the martyr in concentrated upon. This type of analysis will concern itself
Iran, quickly evolved and became an operational component with current theatre of operations I&W pertaining to Canadian
of the Hizbollah organization, which was composed of former military forces, and actual incidents targeting those forces and
Iranian Revolutionary Guards, and was exported to Lebanon their in-theatre allies.
in the fight against the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF). These
suicide bomber attacks, specifically utilizing vehicular-borne
For example, at the ‘strategic early warning’ level of
improvised explosive devices (VBIEDs), targeted Israeli mili- analysis, the various terrorist and insurgent groups that engage
tary convoys and assets. In addition, foreign military and in suicide bombings have signatures which betray the patterns
diplomatic facilities were targeted and destroyed by Hizbollah and techniques that they utilize when engaging in such operaoperatives.4 The use of suicide bombings has since spread tions. In 2003, this author was able to determine the general
globally, and has been used in stand alone attacks, in combi- patterns of suicide bomber delivery modes and target sets by
nations with multiple suicide bombers, or secondary avenue the major groups involved in these activities. These patterns
of approach VBIEDs, and alongside active aggressor assault can be viewed in Table 1 and Table 2.6
and hostage-taking operations. The
Tamil Tigers engaged in their first sui- Major Groups by “Suicide Bomber” Delivery Mode
cide bombing in 1987, Hamas in
Personnel
1993, Palestine Islamic Jihad (PIJ) in Group
Vehicular
Aircraft
Vessel
(Human)
1994, Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK)
in 1996, Al Qaeda in 1998, the al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades
Yes
No
No
No
Chechens in 2000, the Al –Aqsa
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Martyrs Brigades in 2002, and the Al Qaeda
5
Taliban in the 2003/2004 period.
Chechens
Yes
Yes
No
No
Since the early-1980s, well over a
Yes
Yes
No
No
thousand contemporary suicide bomb- Hamas
ings have taken place, with the vast Hezbollah
Yes
Yes
No
No
majority of incidents clustered in the
Yes
No
No
No
Israeli area of operations, Iraq, Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK)
Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka. Palestine Islamic Jihad (PIJ)
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
Canadian military forces deployed
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
overseas have not been immune to Tamil Tigers (LTTE)
S o u r c e : C o u n t e r- O P F O R Pr o g r a m . N L E C T C - We s t © 2 0 0 3
these attacks—a number of instances Table 1
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of Canadian fatalities and
casualties have been documented in Afghanistan—and
they are expected to continue
sporadically into the future
while Canadian forces remain
deployed in that theatre of
operations.

WARFARE IN THE 21ST CENTURY

Major Groups by “Suicide Bomber” Target Set
Civilian
(Personnel)

Military/LE*
(Personnel)

VIP

Transit

Aircraft

Vessel

Buildings/
Infrastructure

al-Aqsa Martyrs
Brigades

Yes

Yes

No

Yes

No

No

Yes

Al Qaeda

Yes

Yes

Yes

No

Yes

Yes

Yes

Chechens

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

No

No

Yes

Hamas

Yes

Yes

No

Yes

No

No

Yes

Hezbollah

Yes

Yes

No

No

No

No

Yes

Kurdistan Workers
Party (PKK)

Yes

Yes

Yes

No

No

No

Yes

Palestine Islamic
Jihad (PIJ)

Yes

Yes

No

Yes

No

Yes

Yes

Tamil Tigers (LTTE)

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Table 2
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These tables were derived from a multi-year study related
to the historical analysis of terrorist and insurgent group suicide bombing incidents. Such incidents, when tracked over
time, readily provide data points concerning the range of casualties (minimums and maximums) of successful operations and
other important information including the time of day, type of
attack, number of perpetrators, and so on. Hamas, for example,
became very adept at utilizing suicide anti-personnel devices
on public buses in Israel while the PKK in Turkey went through
a pattern of utilizing women suicide bombers, some of whom
feigned pregnancy, in order to appear non- threatening to targeted police forces. Additionally, prior to US deployment of
military forces into Iraq in March 2003, this author and a colleague meeting at the County Emergency Operations Center
(CEOC) in Los Angeles, California, came across initial I&W
concerning threatened suicide bombing use against American
forces. This prompted them to begin data collection in
December 2002 on this potential threat and, as a result, to be
able to accurately project that such
opposing force operations would be
take place during Operation Iraqi
Freedom.7 One outcome of this red
team analysis was that this author
was able to provide training at a
Force Protection Conference for the
I Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF)
in Camp Pendleton, California, in
November 2003, regarding this
threat. He specifically focused upon
the historical Hizbollah use of
VBIEDs ramming and detonating in
the middle of Israeli conveys in
Southern Lebanon in the early-1980s
as one of his major areas of concern
for Marine units deployed in Iraq 20
years later.

analysis should then become dominant. At this level, opposing
force tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) should be
included in the operational early warning being conducted.
For Canadian military force protection needs, this red team
analysis should include I&W and the Canadian operational
experience in that theater of operations and/or against that
specific opposing force, such as Al Qaeda elements, if
Canadian forces have engaged them in earlier deployments.
Canadian operational experience is gained through opposing
force suicide bombing plots, both failed attempts, and successful attacks that result in casualties and fatalities inflicted upon
its military forces. These operational level lessons learned
should be broadened to include opposing force suicide bombing operations targeted against allied and coalition forces
alongside which Canadian military forces are deployed. A
basic example of this red team analysis pertaining to successful Al Qaeda and Taliban suicide bombing operations that
resulted in Canadian military fatalities has been highlighted.

R e u t e r s p h o t o RT R 1 B 0 G S b y A h m a d M a s o o d
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Group

After Canadian forces are
deployed into a theatre of operations, such as Afghanistan, the
‘operational early warning’ level of

A British soldier watches security personnel standing in front of vehicles destroyed in Kabul,
Afghanistan by a suicide attack, 15 November 2005.
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•

On August 22, 2006, Corporal
David Braun, 2nd Battalion,
Princess Patricia’s Canadian
Light Infantry, was killed by
a suicide bomber in
Khandar.12

•

A suicide bomber on a bicycle detonated near NATO
troops
in
southern
Afghanistan Monday morning [September 18, 2006] as
they handed out gifts to children, killing four Canadian
soldiers [Corporal Keith
Morely, Corporal Shane
Keating, Private David Byers,
and Corporal Glen Arnold]
and wounding dozens of others, including civilians,
according to the Canadian
military and NATO… The
Canadian soldiers— part of
NATO ’s
International
Security Assistance Forces—

38
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were patrolling the Panjwayi District of
Twelve fatalities have been identified
“Derived from the historical
Kandahar Province when the attack took
via various modes of suicide bombings
place at 9:30 a.m. local time, according
(individual, bicycle, and VBIED) directed
lessons learned, the threat
to ISAF.13
at Canadian military forces while
scenarios themselves
deployed in Afghanistan since earlyshould then begin to be
2002. This represents just under eight
•
Two Canadian soldiers [Corporal
percent of the total Canadian military
Albert
Storm and Chief Warrant Officer
identified for Canadian
fatalities that have taken place in
Robert Girouard]
were killed on
military deployments.”
Afghanistan, with the vast majority of
November 27 [2006] at approximately
these fatalities attributed to IEDs, both
8:35 am (Kandahar time) when their
simple pressure and command-detonated devices. The followBison Light Armoured Vehicle was attacked by a suicide
ing list documents these suicide bomber inflicted fatalities on
bomber driving a car laden with explosives. The incident
Canadian military forces (quoted from news sources):8
occurred on Highway 4 between Kandahar Airfield and
Kandahar City. There were no other Canadian casualties.14
•
A suicide bomber in Kabul, Afghanistan, killed one
Canadian soldier [Corporal Jamie Brendan Murphy] and
wounded three others, officials said [January 27, 2004]. •
Colonel Geoff Parker became the highest ranking
Nine civilians were hurt. Ali Jan Askaryar, head of police
Canadian to die in Afghanistan since Ottawa first comin the western district of Kabul, where the blast occurred,
mitted troops here in 2002 when he was killed Tuesday
said the Canadians were part of a three-vehicle patrol
[May 18, 2010] in a suicide bombing on the eastern outand “a terrorist jumped on one of the vehicles and blew
skirts of Kabul. Colonel Parker, of the Royal Canadian
himself up.”9
Regiment, was traveling with US troops at about 8 a.m.
local time when a suicide bomber driving a mini-van with
nearly a ton of explosives packed inside swerved into
•
On July 22, 2006, Corporal Jason Patrick Warren and
their convoy of three armoured SUVs, killing five
Corporal Francisco Gomez were killed by a suicide car
Americans and at least 12 Afghan civilians who were pasbomb in Kandahar…. 40 minutes after the first bomb - a
sengers in a nearby bus.15
second suicide bomber blew himself up in the middle of
the crowd that had gathered, inflicting fatal injuries on
Qodus [a member of the production crew filming the
This list - in effect, very basic database entries - can be
aftermath of the first suicide bombing] and four other further developed along with Canadian military wounding
civilians and injuring many others.10
incidents and failed suicide bombing attempts that resulted in
no Canadian casualties. This compilation provides some
•
On August 8, 2006, Corporal Andrew James Eykelenboom, insights into the types of suicide bombing incidents to which
1st Field Ambulance, was killed by a suicide car bomb at deployed Canadian forces have been subjected in Afghanistan.
Kandahar Airfield.11

Royal Air Force Senior Aircraftsman Katie Price (centre) plays the role of an insurgent detonating a suicide bomb during Exercise Desert Eagle at the Nevada Test and Training Range, 16 March 2011.
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W

hile still the domain of analytical red teaming, the
development of the suicide bomber threat scenarios
also requires that a few physical red teaming specialists are
involved. This should be considered an A-Red Team
(Analytical) and P-Red Team (Physical) approach. It should be
noted that very few individuals are able to effectively fulfill
both the role of a red team analyst and a red team operator.
When such individuals are identified, they should be considered a valuable commodity and allowed to serve as members
of both red teams for continuity, and to ensure that ‘analytical
intent’ is being followed at the physical training level.
Derived from the historical lessons learned, the threat
scenarios themselves should then begin to be identified for
Canadian military deployments. One approach is to first create
a basic historical threat matrix (See Table 3). The various
activities of a deployed military force are listed and then
cross-referenced with basic suicide bomber threat categories.
The one created in Table 3 provides low, medium, and high
levels of concern, based upon the author’s analysis of which
threat scenarios are more likely to take place than others, as
derived from datasets of global suicide bombing incidents.16
This initial analysis, however, is notional in nature and should
only provide a starting point. This basic matrix would then be
modified with the seven suicide bombing incidents that took
place against Canadian military forces in Afghanistan (listed
earlier) as in-theatre data points. Additionally, wounding only
incidents and failed attacks (in which Canadian military forces
suffered no casualties) can be added, along with suicide
bomber attacks on allied forces. Some form of basic weighted
values approach could be taken, where incidents with deaths
are given a basic weighted number, and wounding and failed
attacks being given a lower weighted value. Additionally, the
columns representing the activities of the deployed military
forces is subject to modification, with some activities being
removed and others being added. Further, the activities themselves could be weighted, with a large amount of Canadian
soldiers barracked at a specific location given a much higher
weighted value, due to what the human and political loss
would represent to the deployment in Afghanistan. This is not
an exact science—far from it—the intent is to determine what
Simple Suicide Bomber

the threat has been to Canadian forces, and which activities of
those forces are more of a concern (valued) than others, so
that the threat scenarios of importance can be identified for
red teaming and force protection training purposes.
Enemy intent, projected capability, I&W events, and incident trending over time must also be considered. The analytical red team, with the addition of some physical red team
members, must address the issue of reactive vs. proactive
analysis in providing its early warning and decision-support
functions. This will have a significant impact upon the development of suicide bomber threat scenarios for training purposes. A reactive approach would focus upon only what types
of suicide bombings have been conducted historically—the
benefit is that it focuses limited monetary resources and red
team analytical thinking with respect to known threats. A proactive approach attempts to project opposing force suicide
bombing operational patterns into the future—the benefit here
is that a deployed military force will not be as likely to get
‘blindsided’ by evolving opposing force suicide bombing tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) and other innovations.
The downside to being proactive is chasing ‘what if scenarios’
and squandering analysis and subsequent training time to the
detriment of preparing against known operational threats. As a
rule, new Canadian military analytical red teams should focus
upon reactive analysis and master that discipline before ever
attempting to take a more proactive approach.17
For the sake of simply showing how the process might
work, in this instance we will go with the priority suicide
bomber threat scenarios identified in Table 3. Those scenarios
with the highest rankings are as follows, and they represent
the best candidates for physical red teaming:
a.

Simple suicide bomber targeting military force at a checkpoint.

b.

Complex suicide bomber targeting field deployed and on
patrol military forces.

c.

Simple VBIED targeting in convoy military forces.

d.

Complex VBIED targeting encamped/barracked military
forces.

Complex Suicide Bomber

Simple VBIED

Complex VBIED

(Multiple individual suicide
bombers with vest bombs/variant with active assault element)

(Lone VBIED with
single driver)

(Multiple VBIEDS/variant
with active assault element)

Low

Low

Medium

*Highest

Checkpoint; Road/
Building (static)

*Highest

Medium

Low

Low

Field Deployed
(dynamic)

Medium

*Highest

Low

Low

On Patrol (dynamic)

Medium

*Highest

Low

Low

In Convoy (dynamic)

Low

Low

*Highest

Medium

R o b e r t J. B u n k e r a n d 17 W i n g Pu b l i s h i n g W i n n i p e g

(Individual suicide bomber
with vest bomb)

Encamped/
Barracked (static)

Table 3 - Suicide Bomber Threat Scenarios vs. Activities of a Deployed Military Force
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No other private entity offers
red team training of this calibre.
However, US military programs
US Army soldiers evaluate casualties after a ‘suicide bomber’ detonated a bomb in a crowd of local
have been stood up such as the
citizens/soldiers during a training mission at Fort Stewart, Georgia, 28 February 2007.
comprehensive 18 week Red Team
The Physical Red Teaming of Suicide Bomber
Leader’s Course which began in 2006 and is provided by the
Threat Scenarios
US Army’s University of Foreign Military and Cultural
Studies (UFMCS) at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. That course
t this point, the red teaming form shifts over to the draws heavily upon anthropology and regional studies in
physical and role-playing world of red team operators. addition to unconventional military theory, doctrine, and hisEither cross-trained individuals who are in both the analytical torical instances of red teaming. Other shorter and more speand physical red teaming cells will be involved for the sake of cialized red teaming courses are now also being offered by
analytical continuity, or a few analytical red team advisors/ UFMCS. The intent is to create course graduates with more
observers will monitor the training to ensure the threat sce- refined critical thinking skills and to develop alternative
narios identified are appropriately followed. Two levels of points of view for Army battle staffs deployed overseas in
training would then take place; a) Canadian military personnel such theatres as Iraq and Afghanistan.20 While the UFMCS
undertake physical red team training and engage in suicide courses will prepare Canadian students to fulfill analytical
bombing operations against Canadian (blue) military units, red team roles, it is unknown to what extent physical red team
and b) the friendly Canadian (blue) military unit in a force training skills, including ideological immersion and role playprotection mission going up against the physical red team.
ing, are taught.

A

Unfortunately, it is still very
common for US military forces to
engage in only “B” level training,
wherein the friendly forces go up
against an ad hoc red team thrown
together without any in-depth
adversarial knowledge. This is
typically seen in domestic base
force protection training, but
deploying US military units have
also found themselves in this situation. A commitment should be
made by the Canadian military to
create actual physical red teams,
and arguments have even been
made, with much merit, that as
many deploying troops as possible
should take at least a week of
physical red teaming training to
better ‘know thine enemy’ before
deploying overseas to Afghanistan.
Pioneering red team training

40
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offered for such deploying forces
was provided by the Terrorism
Research Center (later purchased
by Blackwater) under the Mirror
Image program that began in June
2002, and provided over 100 training courses to US, Canadian, and
allied military, law enforcement,
and governmental personnel. 18
With the disruptive business and
ownership changes to Blackwater
(later Xe), the original training
team, in 2010, reconstituted itself
under
the Aeneas
Group
International, LLC (AGI) banner,
and is now offering this training
under the Terrorism 360 program.19

Two US Army sergeants search the home of a suspected insurgent in Owesat, Iraq, 18 December 2007,
after finding a grenade and other electronic items in response to a suicide bomber attack.
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Another option to help develop physical red teaming skill should be initially determined. Sometimes below zone training
sets is to engage in basic research and to undertake a literature (the red team initially performs below the capabilities of the
friendly force) may be required as much as in
review of what has been written on this trainzone training (red team parity with the
ing. The Red Team Journal website <http://
“Another option to
friendly force) and above zone training (red
redteamjournal.com/ > provides predomihelp develop physiteam superiority over the friendly force), to
nately analytical red teaming information allow training objectives to be met. Training
such as the “reciprocal net assessment”
cal red teaming skill
is always dynamic, and scripting should be
(RNA) approach, however, links and informasets is to engage in
followed as little as possible, with basic
tion exist to some physical resources.
basic research and
training intent, derived from analytical red
Additionally, US military and intelligence
team guidance, promoted within an atmoagency red cells and law enforcement affilito undertake a literasphere of free play and improvisation.
ated entities, such as the National Tactical
ture review of what
Officers Association (NTOA) Project Red,
has been written on
After the physical red team is created
can be contacted for subject matter expert
and equipped, the training scenarios are
support. The guide Red Teams and
this training.”
developed, the referees and other contingenCounterterrorism Training, written by
Stephen Sloan and this author, published in 2011 by University cies are sorted out, and the means by which the training will
of Oklahoma Press, for example focuses upon how to simulate be delivered is determined, the military personnel and units
active-aggressor forces, including those that may utilize sui- taking the training can be focused upon. In this instance,
Canadian military forces being deploying overseas where
cide bombers.
opposing forces have engaged in suicide bombings would be
Once a bona fide physical red team is created, or under given the highest training priority. These forces can either be
some circumstances, a private military red team is contracted, trained following current Canadian force protection doctrine,
the priority suicide bomber threat scenarios identified can be or the training of this doctrine can become a component of the
simulated. ‘Simunitions’ should be utilized. This allows for simulated force protection mission when the friendly unit is
real weapons to be put into service, however, with barrel con- pitted against the physical red team. More competitive unit
versions made so that marking rounds are fired. Simulated commanders will likely engage in their own force protection
explosive devices - from inert suicide vests through VBIEDs, training even if such doctrinal training is provided when the
also have to be obtained or created. The intent is for the unit is up against the red team.21 While this training is not
Canadian military forces to undergo as realistic training as meant to be a ‘win or lose’ proposition for the friendly forces
possible, and thus ‘train as they fight.’ Pyrotechnics, smoke, -since often failure teaches us far more about personnel and
and other elements can also be brought into play. The creation unit readiness than success - some form of competition is
of wounding make up applied to victims, and even recreating always a good training motivator for the forces being trained.
the sights and smells of an engagement - for example, the After action ‘hot washes’ and ‘lessons learned’ sessions are
dumping of animal blood and entrails on a victim requiring also imperative, with candid criticisms of individual and unit
medical attention - should also be considered as options dur- performance in the form of constructive feedback utilized to
ing the simulated suicide bombing attacks against friendly promote learning and training takeaways.
forces. Like all forms of
military training, the various protocols are determined and logically
thought through, the hardware and necessary supplies procured, and the
training venues are either
selected or created.
Training can take place at
a central military facility,
or a mobile training team
approach can be taken. It
is important to note that
simple training should
always take place before
more complex training,
thus the less involved suicide bomber incident scenarios should be conducted first. In addition,
the skill set level exhibited by the red team vis-àvis those being trained International peacekeepers investigate the site of a suicide car bomb attack in Kabul, Afghanistan, 28 January 2004.

Conclusions

•

T

his article has demonstrated that the synergistic use of
analytical and physical red teams together is extremely
useful for the force protection training needs of deploying
Canadian military units overseas in environments such as
Afghanistan, where the ongoing threat of suicide bombings
exist. While both forms of red teams may have in the past
been utilized as ‘stand alone’ options by some military forces
with success—this is especially true of the US armed services— the benefits of utilizing both forms together provide a
far greater spectrum of force protection competency:

Red Team Members Gaining Insights into Opposing
Force Behaviors

Typically, analytical red teaming does not suffer from
being de-coupled from physical red teaming because it provides command decision support and intelligence early warning functions. The training provided by the physical red team,
however, is greatly enhanced by the analytical rigour of the
more intelligence and command-focused red team. The analytical red team will also benefit from its association and links
to the physical red team because of the feedback that it provides concerning the severity of the threat when simulated
under field training conditions.

The benefits of analytical red teams include:
•

Identify I&W Events, Anomalies, and Suicide Bombing
Trends

•

Early Warning (defensive; pre-attack alerts)

•

Futures (offensive; battlespace shaping)

•

Determining Enemy Intent/Capability

•

Decision-Support

•

Reactive and Proactive Strategy Options

•

Identifying Highest Priority
Suicide Bomber Threat Scenarios

•

Analytical Intent
Physical Training

Additionally, the utilization of analytical and physical red
teams is extremely cost effective and should be considered a
direct ‘force multiplier’ that enhances the survivability of
deployed forces by making them less vulnerable to suicide
bomber attacks. Rather than spending limited resources on
expensive military hardware, the red teaming approach invests
in the human capital of the Canadian military forces themselves by means of enhancing their analytical skills, sharpening their understanding of the opposing forces they are facing,
and ‘raising the bar’ for individual soldier and unit force protection training proficiency.

Guiding

•

Increasing Force Protection
Training Proficiency

•

Improved Survivability of the
Forces Trained

•

Identifying
Training
Equipment Deficiencies

•

Determining Force Protection
Doctrinal Shortcomings

•

Limiting Incidents of Tactical
Surprise

R e u t e r s p h o t o RT R 3 6 M E G b y K h a l e e d a l - M o u s u l y

The benefits of physical red
teams include:

and

Residents gather at the site of a bomb attack at Mwafaqija village in Mosul, Iraq, 10 August 2012.

NOTES
1.

2.

The Government of Canada “Red Teaming, Red
Cells and Analytical Decision Support” project
statement of work (SOW) [11-0234;
Q0046BH234] provided background that
describes two elementary forms of red teaming mimetic red teaming and diegetic red teaming.
The author has decided to utilize more common
terminology for these forms of red teaming in this
article. For a basic introduction to red teaming
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A USAF EOD team and US Army soldiers inspect a suicide bomber’s detonated vehicle in Tuz, Iraq, on 17 June 2005, during Operation Iraqi Freedom.
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